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a b s t r a c t
Games consoles present a particular challenge to the forensics investigator due to the nature of the
hardware and the inaccessibility of the file system. Many protection measures are put in place to make it
deliberately difficult to access raw data in order to protect intellectual property, enhance digital rights
management of software and, ultimately, to protect against piracy. History has shown that many such
protections on game consoles are circumvented with exploits leading to jailbreaking/rooting and
allowing unauthorized software to be launched on the games system. This paper details methods that
enable the investigator to extract system activity, deleted images, Internet history items, relevant friends
list information, the console's serial number and plaintext WiFi access point passwords. This is all
possible with the use of publicly available, open-source security circumvention techniques that perform a
non-invasive physical dump of the internal NAND storage of the Nintendo 3DS handheld device. It will
also be shown that forensic integrity is maintained and a detailed analysis is possible without altering
original evidence.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Games consoles with a range of connectivity and rich func-
tionality are a valuable source of evidence with features such as
Internet browsing capability, social media sharing and email/chat
like conversation options (Conrad et al., 2010; Moore et al., 2014;
Davies et al., 2015; Read et al., 2016). The original Nintendo 3DS
console was released in Japan on February 26th, 2011 (NDS-Gear,
2019). More than six years after its release, the console has gone
through numerous iterations including the Nintendo 3DS XL, New
Nintendo 3DS, New Nintendo 3DS XL, Nintendo 2DS, and the New
Nintendo 2DS XL.
The 3DS, Nintendo's highest selling active console with 73.53
million units sold worldwide (Nintendo, 2018) has already been
involved in criminal activities (Ashcroft, 2013) as has its prede-
cessor the DSi (Hanlon, 2012). It is aimed at a younger/family
friendly audience; as of 29th January 2019 the ESRB has in its DS/
DSi/3DS category 2587 games rated at Early Childhood/Everyone,
but only 38 rated as Mature (17þ) or above (ESRB, 2019). It is
reasonable to conclude that a case involving a 3DS is more likely to
involve minors. Therefore it warrants particular note from the
digital forensic community to improve existing methods of data
extraction and analysis to support, in the United States at least, the
Daubert standard.
Alongside the growth of the popularity of the 3DS, interest in
hacking and modifying the device has continued over the course of
the console's lifespan (McClintic et al., 2018; Scires et al., 2018). On
May 19th, 2017, a vulnerability known as the ‘boot9strap’ vulner-
ability was published online (3ds, 2019). This vulnerability, in
conjunctionwith an exploit known as ‘ntrboot,’ allows for arbitrary
code execution to occur before the console has booted to the sys-
tem menu. This allows for a restorable backup of the system's
NANDmemory to be takenwithout booting the console, paving the
way for a forensically sound methodology.
Like other game systems, the Nintendo 3DS uses a non-volatile
NAND chip to store the system firmware and user settings infor-
mation. The firmware is loaded from the NAND by the bootloader
when the console is powered on (Gowrishankar, 2016). The 3DS
console NAND is encrypted with a key that is specific to each
console, meaning that the NAND cannot be analyzed without
obtaining this decryption key. Although JTAG has been shown as a
viable method to extract the NAND, it still requires hardware
modification and some other means to obtain the decryption key to* Corresponding author. Norwich University, Northfield, VT, USA.
E-mail address: hread@norwich.edu (H.O.L. Read).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Digital Investigation
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/d i in
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.diin.2019.04.015
1742-2876/© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of DFRWS. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Digital Investigation 29 (2019) S61eS70
make the image readable. This forensic analysis will use a console
purchased in the USA; it should be noted that some folder names on
the NAND do differ slightly between regions. A valuable source of
information for folder names may be found in 3dbrew (2015a).
2. Related work
Prior work by Read et al. (2016) in their paper entitled “A
forensic methodology for analyzing Nintendo 3DS devices”, pre-
sented a summary of different features (Read et al., 2016: Table 1)
that would be of interest to the forensic examiner including the
web browser, camera, friend lists, activity log and game notes.
What follows is a detailed forensic analysis methodology based
upon empirical research providing a guide for an examiner to
follow while performing a live analysis of the console. The authors
also state that, by investigating the device in this fashion, it miti-
gated issues associated with dumping encrypted NAND images but
“may have an impact on the state of the device” (Read et al., 2016).
These impacts were minimized by adhering to UK ACPO guidelines
to “minimise alterations, tampering and modifications of the
original evidence to the extent possible” (Read et al., 2016).
Significant changes in the Nintendo 3DS hacking community
has led the authors to less invasive forms of forensic analysis. The
work conducted in this paper leading to the forensic acquisition of a
3DS would not be possible without the seminal work by Scires et al.
(2018) and the tools created as a result of their research. Their paper
made use of flaws discovered in the RSA signature verification of
one of the boot ROMs (the ARM9 boot ROM known as “Boot9”) to
cause firmware created by third parties to appear valid to the
signature parser. Alternative firmware could notionally be used to
redirect boot ROM code flow, execute a payload which then be-
comes a persistent exploit to allow extraction of information from
protected areas of memory.
Further discoveries (Scires et al., 2018) made by analyzing the
protected half of the Boot9 ROM revealed that, before it attempts to
load a firmware image from the internal NAND, it will check if the
device is closed or the physical sleep switch is ‘on’ (e.g., in the case
of the 2DS) and whether the START, SELECT and X buttons are
depressed. Boot9 checks if a DS cartridge is inserted and if so, at-
tempts to load a signed firmware from it, bypassing the firmware
on the NAND.
As confirmed inMcClintic et al. (2018), the trust in the 3DS is the
boot ROM which is burned into the System-on-Chip (SoC) during
the manufacturing process. Many embedded systems use this
method as it prevents 3rd parties from modifying the boot ROM as
they are physically unable to write to the SoC, only read from it. In a
similar fashion, limera1n exploit on early Apple iPhone devices
could not be prevented without first updating the manufacturing
process (iPhoneWiki, 2019).
When such vulnerabilities are found and are made exploitable,
patching the issue consists of changing the SoC at the factory for all
future revisions of the hardware. This is significant as the vulner-
ability will continue to exist in all Nintendo 3DS devices prior to
discovery of the exploit (assuming Nintendo chooses to update the
manufacturing process and change the boot ROM) providing a
permanent method to perform digital forensic analysis.
These types of vulnerabilities allow opportunities to improve
digital forensic analysis techniques as shown in this paper. How-
ever, the devices that are manufactured to deploy such exploits
have come under close scrutiny in the past. Unofficial game car-
tridges, known colloquially as flashcarts (as they are user-writable)
are commonly associated with software piracy. Of particular in-
terest is the British court case between Nintendo Company Ltd. v.
Playables Ltd. (Nintendo, 2010) which addresses the issue of copy
infringement and copy-protection devices. The company, Playables
Ltd. (based in the UK) imported a number of flashcarts (referred to
as “game copiers” in Nintendo, 2010) which fit the proprietary
cartridge connection in a previous-generation console, the Nin-
tendo DS. One of the key arguments the defense made during the
case was that they “argued that it [Playbles Ltd.] did not know that
the devices would be used for this purpose and that the devices can
be used for legal purposes” (Outlaw, 2010). The court rejected this
defense as it did not provide legal cover for other illegal uses, i.e.
software piracy. In section 296 of the 1988 Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act (Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988), an offence is
committed if a person behind the sale of “any means the sole
intended purpose of which is to facilitate the unauthorised removal
or circumvention of the technical device” knows or believes it will
be used to make illegal copies of software. The UK High Court said
that Playables Ltd. did have this knowledge (Outlaw, 2010) and
therefore in breach of the law. More recently in Canada in Nintendo
of America Inc. v. King (2017), a similar judgement was made
whereby the respondents were found to be liable for circumvention
and/or infringement of the 2012 amendments to the 1985 Copy-
right Act. Of particular interest is section [33] which provides a list
of the offending devices that were made available for sale; the first
such item, R4i 3DS, is the immediate predecessor to the device used
in this research (R4iþ 3DS) that made the forensic analysis pre-
sented in this paper possible.
3. Contribution
Although the forensic analysis of a Nintendo 3DS has been
addressed before (Read et al., 2016) this paper makes a number of
improvements to the field. The 3DS has the ability to store data on a
memory card (Nintendo, n.d.) and on an internal NAND chip. This
paper presents a forensically soundmethod of extracting the NAND
and provides detailed analysis of different artifacts of interest to the
digital forensic examiner. It demonstrates that the NAND disk im-




8 Timestamp, number of milliseconds since epoch (Jan. 1st, 2000). Default bookmarks are zeroed out.
4 Unknown
1 Counter. The byte increments the bookmark entry. First value is 0x00.
1 Unknown
1 Appears to have the value 0x01 if a default bookmark, 0x00 if a user added bookmark.
1 Unknown, always 0x01
200 Unknown, has data for default bookmarks, zeroed for user-generated.
400 URL (null-padded)
200 Bookmark name
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workstation, without the use of the original 3DS console. The
method is repeatable and verifiable, using best-practice hashing to
confirm multiple extractions are digitally identical. After a review
of available literature, it appears that this paper is possibly the first
to make use of tools that circumvent security which are commonly
associated with copyright infringement to develop more effective
methods for the analysis of game console devices. Finally, by using
hardware that is commonly associated with facilitating piracy (i.e.,
flashcarts), it can provide an interesting consideration on how law
enforcement can use such tools as it becomes more difficult to
purchase or access them in their own country.
4. Method and tools
The first challenge to the investigator is assembling the right
collection of tools. As discussed in the literature review, 3DS con-
soles may be instructed to launch alternative firmware from a
standard DS cartridge. Nintendo does not provide any cartridges
that have this capability for obvious reasons, however there are
several third-party sources that have independently developed and
sold such devices. The R4iþ 3DS/DS (henceforth R4i) cartridge was
used by the authors and found to be particularly effective at per-
forming the digital forensic tasks. The flashcarts cartridges have the
unique ability of being writable in nature. Unfortunately, such de-
vices are commonly associated with copyright infringement
(Nintendo, 2017, Nintendo Support, 2019). Technical information
about the flashcart may be seen in the manufacturer's website
(r4ids, 2019). It should be noted, that the information on this
particular webpage also appears to demonstrate how to use the
device for copyright infringement. The authors do not condone
these illegal activities, but rather provide the reference to the
website for the forensic investigator to understand the usage of the
R4i flashcart for lawful means and for digital forensic analysis
purposes only.
The R4i flashcart is presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. For comparison
purposes in Fig. 1, a Nintendo DS cartridge appears on the left, a
Nintendo 3DS cartridge appears on the right. Within the R4i
flashcart, there are a few important areas to highlight. Fig. 2 shows
the flashcart itself, with a microSD slot in the upper-right of the
image. ThemicroSD slot in the R4i was not used in the experiments,
rather all microSD (for devices designated as new) and SD (for all
original 3DS devices) cards were inserted into the console itself.
Furthermore, there is a small white switch just underneath the
microSD slot on the R4i. The switch can toggle between an N or a D.
D enables DS functionality (not used in this paper), N enables the
NTRboot functionality (i.e. the ability to boot from a DS, rather than
3DS, cartridge if the conditions (specific button presses) discussed
in Scires et al. (2018) are met). It is important for the forensic
investigator to note that the switch should be set to N which will
allow dumping the internal NAND and the key required for
decryption.
4.1. Preparing the flashcart
The R4i card lets the investigator redirect the boot process from
the internal firmware to a microSD/SD card in the Nintendo 3DS.
The MicroSD/SD card must be prepared in a particular fashion;
detailed guides exist online (3DS Guide, 2019); the general process
is as follows:
1. A reflashable cartridge is preparedwith the ntrboot files (the R4i
used by the authors is pre-flashed with ntrboot_flasher
(ntrteam, 2019)).
2. The original microSD/SD card in the console is forensically
imaged and set aside. A new microSD/SD is prepared with the
following tools:
a. boot9strap (Scires, 2017b) which enables Boot9 code
execution
b. decrypt9WIP (decrypt9, 2017) which performs the actual
dumping of NAND and the system's encryption key.
Fig. 1. DS (L), R4i (M), 3DS (R).
Fig. 2. Inside the R4i.
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4.2. Dumping the NAND
The actual process of obtaining a dump of the internal NAND is
as follows:
1. Ensure the console is in an off state (not suspend).
2. Fold-open the console (ignore if using a Nintendo 2DS).
3. Use a magnet to trigger the sleep switch on the 3DS.
Fig. 3 identifies where the switch is, just below and right of the
yellow B button. If analyzing an original Nintendo 2DS, enable
the sleep switch instead (no magnet required).
4. With the magnet in place (or sleep switch enabled on the
original 2DS), hold START, SELECT, X and the POWER button to
turn on the console. These should be held for about 10 seconds
and and then can be released. The magnet (or sleep switch) can
be removed at this juncture. This can take some practice, it is
advised that the investigator familiarise themselves on another
console to limit unintentional alteration of their evidence.
5. If the process worked correctly, the analyst should be presented
with a screen similar to Fig. 4. The Decrypt9WIP application,
initialised from the microSD/SD card, will perform three
important functions for the forensic analyst:
a. Backup of the internal NAND via SysNAND Options - >
SysNAND Backup/Restore… - > NAND Backup. This creates
two files, the NAND.bin and a NAND.bin.sha (SHA256 value).
b. Verification of the NAND dump via SysNAND Options
- > SysNAND Backup/Restore… - > Validate NAND Dump.
c. Backup of the unique encryption key (XOR) needed to decrypt
the NAND dump via XORpad Generator Options
- > CTRNAND Padgen, nand.fat16.xorpad.
6. Once the NAND and the encryption key have been dumped to
the microSD/SD card and the NAND dump verified, the console
can be powered off by pressing LEFT and START on the main
Decrypt9WIP menu.
7. Once the console is off; the microSD/SD card can be removed
and put into the forensic workstation. The SHA256 of the
NAND.bin may be created and compared to the value stored in
NAND.bin.sha.
Fig. 3. Magnet location.
Fig. 4. Decrypt9WIP tool for dumping NAND.
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4.3. Decrypting NAND contents
At this point, the analyst will have three files, the encrypted
NAND.bin, the SHA256 hash stored in NAND.bin.sha and the
encryption key nand.fat16.xorpad. The NAND.bin file itself contains
two partitions, the backwards-compatible DSi partition and the
3DS partition (3dbrew, 2017b). The 3DS partition, or CTRNAND,
contains artifacts of interest to the examiner. To decrypt the
NAND.bin for use in digital forensic tools, the dump contents must
first be passed through an XOR function. This may be achieved
using a dedicated XORing application, like 3DSFAT16Tool
(3DSFAT16tool) as seen in Fig. 5. With the process taken thus far,
the tool will take the NAND.bin as input, the nand.fat16.xorpad as
input, and XOR the CTRNAND partition to produce a decrypted
version in a raw, uncompressed format and dump the results into a
new FAT16 image (e.g., using the -d dump flag, as shown in Fig. 5).
The filesystem is recognized as FAT16 which is readily understood
by many digital forensic tools.
5. Forensic analysis
This paper seeks to perform a number of experiments of interest
to the forensic examiner to determinewhat evidencemay be left on
a 3DS without having to boot or investigate the device live as in
Read et al. (2016). A second-hand version of the new Nintendo 3DS
was used for the experimentation; findings were later confirmed
against a newly-purchased 3DS XL, an original 3DS and an original
2DS. The second-hand version was updated to firmware version
11.6.0e39Uwhichwas themost up-to-date at the time the research
was conducted. The console was used to play several games and
had around 50 friends listed in the friends list, and was connected
to different WiFi access points.
OSFMount (PassMark Software, 2019) was used to enable a
Windows based system to mount the decrypted CTRNAND parti-
tion as read-only. AccessData's Forensic Toolkit 7.0 was used to
perform forensic analysis. Fig. 6 presents the folder structure of the
CTRNAND.
The main folder of interest is the data folder. Within the data
folder, is a directory made up of alphanumeric characters which
represents a SHA256 hash of console-unique data (ID0 in 3dbrew,
2017b) providing a unique value. The extdata and sysdata folders
are found within this ID0 directory.
5.1. Analyzing the extdata folder
The extdata (or extra data) folder stores additional, arbitrary
data for an application (3dbrew, 2015b). The directory structure
may be seen in Fig. 7. A single folder titled 00048000 is present
within the extdata folder and contains a number of sub-folders
which represent several applications. Within this are a number of
folders (beginning with “f”) that represent the data storage for
built-in applications. Finally, each of these have a single folder,
00000000, which contains the actual content. By default, there are
two files 00000001 and 00000002 which are part of the core
operating system. The timestamps reflect an earlier date (2002 on
the new 3DS XL and new 3DS, 2001 on the original 3DS and 2011 in
the 2DS devices tried) and do not appear to be updated based on
usage. If present, 00000003 and above are created by a user's ac-
tions and have a timestamp reflecting the action taken by an
individual.
Of particular interest to the examiner are the contents of the
camera app (f0000001) and the sound recorder app (f0000002).
5.2. Camera app - f0000001
Within the camera app directory f0000001, the subdirectory
00000000 contains files of interest to the examiner. As mentioned
above, 00000001 and 00000002 are present by default. Access-
Data's FTK was used to analyze the remaining files. The 0000003
and 00000004 files are created after the camera app has been used
and remain even if all pictures have been deleted. The timestamp of
00000003 is updated when a picture is taken or when a picture is
deleted. 00000004 appears to reflect the initialization of the
camera app and does not change thereafter.
If present, 00000005 and above contain embedded pictures
(one per file - n.b. “3D” images appear as two embedded files,
slightly off-center from each other) in JPEG format (i.e, file header
0xFFD8FFE1). FTK successfully carved all the images taken. The
images were then deleted using the camera app's delete function.
Another NAND image was obtained and put through a second file
carve. FTK was able to carve out all the deleted pictures.
The images themselves contain a substantial amount of meta-
data in the EXIF headers. Using ExifTool (Harvey, 2019) in the
following fashion exiftool -a -u -g1 filename.jpg a wealth of
metadata was obtained. Of particular interest within the “ExifIFD”
group, create date and date/time original tags provided the creation
date of the image. Within the Nintendo group, time stamp (which
again reflected the creation time of the image) and a tag labelled
“internal serial number” were obtained.
5.3. Sound app - f0000002
Within the sound app directory f0000002, the subdirectory
00000000 contains files of interest. As before, 00000001 and
00000002 are present by default and are of little evidentiary value.
Files 00000003 and above contain sound recordings made by the
built-in microphone. They are in the m4a format (i.e., file header
0x66747970).
PhotoRec was able to extract the m4a files. The sound clips were
then deleted, and the console re-imaged. PhotoRec was able to
recover all the deleted audio files. ExifTool (Harvey, 2019) providedFig. 5. 3DSFAT16tool.
Fig. 6. Contents of the NAND
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an interesting insight into the metadata; the intuitively-named
entries with “date” in the title were all consistent with one
another, but were all incorrect by several years. A manual conver-
sionwith epoch set at Jan. 1, 2000 (see analysis of the Web Browser
below) did not correct the skew. However, the investigator will
want to take note of the Title entry; it presented the correct date in
M/D/Y H:M:S in string format.
5.4. Analyzing the sysdata folder
The sysdata (or system savedata) provides storage for the ap-
plications on the 3DS. Every module/application on the NAND has a
savegame associated with it. Within the sysdata folder are a
number of subdirectories which represent the different applica-
tions (3DBrew, 2015a). Within each a save file, 00000000 may be
identified. The timestamps are not particularly helpful. Using the
classifications available at 3dbrew (2015a), system modules (those
beginning with 0001xxxx in Fig. 8) have a factory default set be-
tween the year 2000 and 2001 and do not change when used. The
system applications and applet saves (those beginning with
0002xxxx in Fig. 8) have a timestamp set to their first initialization
and do not change. At best, an investigator could deduce when the
latter were first launched based on the timestamps.
There are 11 (12 in recent updates) different system module
savegames, all of which have an entry in sysdata. There are 22
system application savegames, only those which have been
explicitly opened will appear in sysdata. The system modules are
functions like Spotpass (3dBrew, 2017c), whereas the applications
include the Internet Browser and the microSD card management
application. Analysis was performed on both the system modules
and system applications. The windows strings (Russinovich, 2016)
command was the main tool used to parse the files into human-
readable text.
5.5. Friends e 00010032
The Friends system module savegame can be located under the
00010032 folder. Within this folder is the standard 00000000 file
(3DBrew, 2017d). Analyzing this file with strings yielded the names
and publicly displayed messages of all friends that have been added
to the console. In addition the 3DS console's Serial number, user-
name, and public message were all viewable.
5.6. microSD management e 00020241
The microSD Management application is specific to the New
Nintendo 3DS line of 3DS consoles only. Since the microSD card of
the New Nintendo 3DS is kept behind a screwed-in back cover,
Nintendo offers this application, which temporarily turns a New
Nintendo 3DS into a device that can be accessed by a SMB network
connection. No system/NAND files can be accessed in this manner,
only files stored on the console's microSD card (3DBRew, 2018b).
The microSD Management application savegame can be located
under the 00020241 folder. This is by far one of the smallest
savegame files of any application or system module. Within this
folder is the standard 00000000 file. Analyzing this file with the
strings command yields a number of things, including the SSID of
any network stored within the console. The file also contains the
name the device is given when joining the network (in this case,
‘3DS-6599’) and the device's required login name and PIN to gain
access to it, in this case ‘User’ and ‘77XX.’ The ‘OTHER’ field is also
the name of the workgroup in the console's respective network.
5.7. Internet browser - 000200bb
The New and original 3DS systems have different storage for-
mats for the web browser (3DBrew, 2018). The original 3DS has not
been analyzed at the time of writing due to time constraints in the
research. In the New Nintendo 3DS console, the Internet Browser
application savegame can be located under the 000200bb folder; A
file carve after browsing the web does not reveal any images of the
web pages visited. This suggests the 3DS does not keep a local
webcache like desktop web browsers. However, it is possible to
extract the bookmarks (name, URL, date& time of creation) and the
history (name, URL, data & time of visit). Using the 3DS Save File
Extraction Tool, in particular disa-extract.py (wwylele, 2018), the
file t.bin can be extracted from 00000000.
It was found that the analyst can investigate 00000000 directly
after analysis of t.bin as this extracted file is readable in its host. The
investigator should search for the header of t.bin inside 00000000,
0x100000080DF0A00. From this offset, the start of the first book-
mark entry can be found 0xD8 bytes later, the first value is
0000000000000000 0000000000000101. Table 1 describes the
structure of a bookmark entry (0  810 bytes).
After the last bookmark, the next timestamp is zero, but the
counter and the following value are 0xFF. This is then repeated
every 0  810 bytes until a final value of 0xFFFFFFFF00007E43
(followed by 8 null bytes) is reached. Based on the offsets, it appears
there is enough capacity (0x31E30 bytes) for 0x63 (99 decimal)
bookmarks on the new Nintendo 3DS. This is confirmed in the
bookmarks function of the web browser (xx/99).
The history follows a near-identical structure as in the above
Fig. 7. 3DS extdata folder structure.
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table. Immediately after the bookmark final value, the first 8 bytes
represent the timestamp. Of the second 8 bytes, the first 3 are
either 0x010101 or 0x010100 (remainder are null). If the third byte
is 0x01, it indicates the next 0 200 bytes have data. The remainder
of the structure is identical to the bookmarks.
After the last history item, the next timestamp is null, the next
byte is 0x01. The remainder of the entry (0  807 bytes) is filled
with null bytes. This repeats until the value 0x0100000001000000
appears. Based on the offsets, it appears there is the same capacity
(0x31E30 bytes) as with bookmarks, for 0x63 (99 decimal) items on
the new Nintendo 3DS.
After analysis of theweb browser, the built-in reset functionality
was tested (Fig. 9). An image of the NAND was taken and the
method above was used to successfully retrieve all bookmarks and
history entries. AccessData FTK did mark the folder 000200bb was
deleted but the data could be recovered.
5.8. Config services - 00010017
The Config Services system module savegame can be located
under the 00010017 folder. Within this folder is the savegame file
00000000 (3DBrew, 2017a). After an investigation of the WiFi
configuration entries, it was discovered that WiFi SSIDs and their
passwords are stored in plaintext. An investigator may search for
the start of the embedded config file with 0x4100E44100, noting
the offset. Then, following guidance in 3DBrew (2017a), search for
the WiFi configuration slot block IDs. The offset to the WiFi entry
can be located by adding offset in the block entry to the one noted
earlier.
The 3DS was added to three access points, their passwords
accessible in the manner described above. Two of the entries were
erased, the console was re-imaged. One of entries was recoverable
(see Fig. 10); the others could not be found (neither by explicitly
searching for the known SSID nor the known password).
5.9. Further experiments
5.9.1. Impact of booting system
Booting the 3DS normally into the main menu and then pow-
ering it is enough to change the hash of the image. Given that the
keypress combinations can easily be missed causing the console to
boot, a comparisonwas made between a pristine capture and those
created after booting. A hash set was collected from the files in the
pristine image. This set was then applied using the known file filter
(KFF) functionality in AccessData's FTK to ignore known files in
subsequent images and remove them from view. Less than 1.7% of
files were different in successive iterations of booting the console.
Changes were observed in sysdata related to live configuration
settings (00010017 and 00010022), online services SpotPass
(000100034) and News (00010035), and the Home Menu applica-
tion (0002008F). Changes observed in extdata are similar, with
HomeMenu and SpotPass storage (f000000d), SpotPass notification
storage (f0000009), and play/usage records (f000000b).
5.9.2. Analysis of title.db
On the root of the decrypted NAND disk image is a folder dbs or
databases. Within this folder is several files, one of which is the
title.db file. Analyzing the title.db file with strings does not reveal
much other than lots of ‘CTR-N-HXXX’ entries. These strings are
actually the installed titles that are present on the console. While
most of these are default system titles, some of them can actually be
installed games (Decrypt9, 2019). For example, ‘CTR-P-AQEE’ is the
system title for The Legend of Zelda™: Ocarina of Time™ 3D. The
last four letters of the system title can be searched in 3dsdb.com to
reveal the game's actual title. This can be helpful in seeing exactly
what software was installed on the console, without having to live
boot the console to check.
5.9.3. Restoring a NAND dump
The process of decoding the core files on a Nintendo 3DS is a
lengthy process, but does provide a greater level of detail by looking
Fig. 8. sysdata (system savedata) directory structure.
Fig. 9. Reset function in the new 3DS browser.
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at raw data. However, there are reasons why a live investigation
could also be performed; it provides quicker interpretation of the
data using native tools built into the game console, and reduces the
lag time between the release of a new application and the decod-
ing/validation of the raw files by the community. Furthermore,
there is information of significance on a microSD/SD card that has
not been the focus of this paper. An investigator could follow
guidance in Read et al. (2016) to retrieve information in a live
fashion to help them with current casework.
This experiment restored an earlier NAND taken from the de-
vice. Although best practice when working with traditional media
(e.g. hard drives, USB sticks, etc.) is to clone data to another system,
this is difficult with a Nintendo 3DS game console. Each 3DS has a
unique key (which is dumped to nand.fat16.xorpad) which cannot
readily be uploaded to another device. Although it is technically
possible to transfer the data for analysis on another system
(Plailect, 2019), the process involves installation of several appli-
cations on the original console to prepare for transfer which will
alter the original NAND data considerably and therefore has the
potential to overwrite evidence.
The NAND.bin, NAND.bin.sha and nand.fat16.xorpad need to be
placed on the microSD/SD card. Using the Decrypt9WIP tool func-
tion located at SysNAND Options - > SysNAND Backup/Restore …
- > NAND Restore, and following the instructions in Fig. 11 will
begin the restore process.
After it was flashed, a new NAND dump was immediately
capturedwithout launching the 3DS firmware. After hashing, it was
found that the SHA256 of the reflashed and reimaged dump was
the same as the original. In this fashion, an investigator could
forensically image the 3DS as described in Method and Tools,
proceed to turn the device on and investigate live, then restore the
initial capture to confirm findings.
5.10. Impact of system erase
The 3DS has a format system memory function (Fig. 12). Its
impact on the 3DS was assessed by using files with known signa-
tures that could be data-carved (JPEG pictures taken with the
Camera app), erasing using the function, and then imaging. After
analysis, FTK confirmed the filesystem had been altered (the
Camera app location described earlier did not contain any user-
generated files i.e. those of 00000003 and above). However, the
data carve function was able to recover all the pictures from un-
allocated space. Furthermore, each Nintendo 3DS has a unique xor
key (dumped as the nand.fat16.xorpad file) which remains constant
after a system erase takes place.
6. Discussion
The methods outlined above enable an investigator to extract
and decrypt the contents of a Nintendo 3DS NAND memory chip.
This provides access to a number of key sources of information
including: deleted images, internet history items, relevant friends
list information, console serial number and plaintext access point
passwords. This can be achieved without fully booting the device.
The memory extraction was repeated (without booting the Nin-
tendo 3DS between extractions) and the successive SHA256 hashes
proved to be the same indicated that the process is consistent and
does not alter the NAND contents. This suggests a forensically
sound method of imaging the console.
This is therefore a more forensically sound method than that of
accessing the device via the user interface and therefore provides a
more in depth method than Read et al. (2016). However this
method requires the use of tools and techniques developed by the
hacking and modding communities that seek to expand the capa-
bilities of devices like the Nintendo 3DS. It also relies on the use of a
flashcart device that can no longer be sold or supplied in certain
jurisdictions.
There are many companies that operate in the cyber security/
forensics domain, developing analysis tools for forensic in-
vestigators. Clearly these companies need to understand the de-
vices that they analyse and operate on, be it a car, IoT system or
mobile device. An in depth analysis would be needed to be able to
identify the key areas within a device to ensure the information is
extracted and interpreted correctly. Bugs and vulnerabilities in the
devices might be employed to extract information. In the README,
supplied with the software used in this process, the software
author notes much of the iOS-related code is very similar to that
used in the jailbreaking sceneda community of iPhone hackers
that typically breaks into iOS devices and release its code publicly
for free. Techniques that have already been used by other in-
vestigators to extract data from mobile devices, including law
enforcement in some jurisdictions (Chang et al., 2015).
The question then is that if these tools and techniques are
known to the hacking and modding community, should they be
ignored by the forensics community. The authors do not approve or
condone any action that result in the infringement of intellectual
property rights, it is suggested that ignoring the fact that these tools
Fig. 10. SSID swrfd, Password aaalll222999.
Fig. 11. Decrypt9WIP restore NAND function.
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(which are in the public domain) exist serves no useful purpose.
The code is open source and can be examined and tested as in this
paper and not to use these resources disadvantages the forensic
examiner.
7. Conclusions
A collection of hacking tools designed to enable modifications
and unlawful game play on 3DS can be used to extract a NAND
dump of the console. This technique can be performed to provide a
backup of the console's memory. Although the NAND image is
encrypted with a console specific encryption key, it can be
decrypted due to advancements made by the console hacking
community. This software is open source and can be examined to
ensure veracity.
Once the contents are extracted and decrypted a myriad of
system and application modules can be investigated. Relevant
deleted pictures, audio and videos, deleted Internet history items,
relevant friendslist information, the console's serial number,
plaintext access point passwords, can be extracted and analysed
offline. A great deal of information can be obtained through the
decrypted NAND analysis. Much of this information can not be
accessed via other means and it could be that vital evidence might
be missed without the NAND level analysis.
8. Future work
As discussed in the contribution section, there do not appear to
be any other digital forensics research papers that rely upon tools
typically associated with illegal activities (i.e. copyright infringe-
ment through use of flashcarts) to obtain non-invasive, forensi-
cally-sound methods of data extraction. The authors would like to
explore the broader implications of using such tools when retailers
have been found in breach of the law for selling products circum-
venting copy-protection measures. Furthermore, many of the
forensic artifacts identified from the 3DS NAND came from manual
parsing and extraction. The authors hope to develop automated
tools that can extract information of forensic significance for the
analyst in the future.
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